Thursday, March 29, 2007
A Brief Manifesto
Burt Prelusky weighed in with a brief manifesto of the policies advanced by the liberal agenda. Meanwhile, Jon Sanders (not the same Jon Sanders who happens to be my brother) has a rather humorous article about diversity in the university. And finally, Mark Shea compares "realism" to reality as pertaining to Christ and the Apostles.
Sunday, March 25, 2007
"The Clash of Orthodoxies": A Review
Western civilization today is immersed in a deep struggle between two orders, two sorts of orthodoxy. The traditional order, which may be thought of the Judeo-Christian Orthodoxy consisting of faithful Catholics, conservative Protestants, and observant Jews, finds itself pitted against the newer order of “isms”—feminism, sexual liberationism, secularism, multiculturalism, moral relativism—a sort of modern liberal orthodoxy. This so-called “culture war” is often depicted as being a fight between the forces of “faith” and those of “reason.” To be sure, the Judeo-Christian orthodoxy does largely consists in the more orthodox and observant members of the various religious communities, while secularists tend to favor the modern liberal orthodoxy, but this does not mean that these two orders represent “faith” and “reason” separately: in fact, reason is often on the side of faith in this conflict. So contends Princeton’s McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Robert P. George, in his “The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis.”
George argues that on every issue of law pertaining to public morality, from abortion and stem cell research to pornography and gay marriage, reason itself is on the side of the Judeo-Christian orthodoxy. On issues of life, for example, he notes that “If we lay aside all of the rhetorical grandstanding and obviously fallacious arguments, questions of abortion, infanticide, suicide, and euthanasia turn on the question of whether life is intrinsically good, as Judaism and Christianity teach, or merely instrumentally good, as orthodox secularists believe.” If the former is true, then all humans, even the disabled and unborn, have an inherent dignity which “transcend the instrumental purposes to which their lives can be put.” In other words, the value of those persons’ lives does not hinge on such things as what they are capable of, or what the “quality” of those lives may be.
Those who embrace the secularist view that life is merely instrumentally good do so by embracing a sort of dualistic philosophy. Such a philosophy views “the human person as an essentially non-bodily being who inhabits a nonpersonal body.” This view “contrasts with the Judeo-Christian view of the human person as a dynamic unity of body, mind, and spirit.” However, the everyday experiences of any person will show that the dualistic interpretation of “personhood” is utter nonsense: “We don’t sit in the physical body and direct it as an instrument, the way we sit in a car and make it go left or right.” Any theory which seeks to defend such a dualism will ultimately contradict itself, because “reflection necessarily begins from one’s own conscious awareness as oneself as a unitary actor,” that is, as a unity of the mind, body, and will.
Such a defender will therefore be left with no place from which to begin:
The same might be said about issues of sexual morality. The traditional Judeo-Christian view towards sex is that it has an intrinsic good as the unification of two people—emotionally, spiritually, psychologically, and bodily. Such unification is inherently tied to the procreative end of sex, as the only act in which two organisms act as a single organism to create new life. “Since men and women are essentially embodied (an not simply inhabitors of a suit of flesh), the biological union of spouses in reproductive-type acts consummates and actualizes their marriage, making the spouses truly, and not merely metaphorically, ‘two in one flesh’.”
Secularists treat sex in a different manner, viewing it as a means of attaining pleasure, or of becoming closer, or of releasing stress—in other words, they view intercourse as being merely instrumentally good. The same can be said of marriage. However, this concept of marriage and sex relies on Hume’s noncognitivist understanding of practical reasoning as being the slave of the passions. “Marital communion cannot be a noninstrumental reason so far as [they are] concerned, because, on this account, there are no noninstrumental reasons.” Such reason is therefore not as detachedly rational or logical as secularists would prefer to claim.
Having refuted such arguments of modern liberalism against the intrinsic good of such things as marriage, life, and traditional morality in general, George then turns to questions of public morality and the law. Many such liberals tend to often turn to the tactic of arguing against the “imposition” of morality on society, even if that morality may be right, because not all people hold to such morality. In other words, they argue that the law ought to maintain a sort of strict moral neutrality. George notes first that this is akin to the old argument against the abolitionists: “If you don’t like slavery, don’t hold slaves.”
There is a second problem with the concept of moral neutrality where it tends towards a sort of “libertinism” towards the law. George notes that “Any effort to achieve neutrality will inevitably prove to be self-defeating. For the law is a teacher.” Thus, for example, by permitting abortion, the law teaches that there is nothing wrong with it, and thus undermines any attempts to establish a consistent culture of life; this in turn tends to undermine such attempts to preserve the sanctity of life in areas such as euthanasia, suicide, cloning, and the “therapeutic” killing of those people who have been deemed “defective.” As regarding marriage, the law can either teach that
Given the nature of human psychology and sexual morality, the result of this would “be the development of practices and ideologies which tend to undermine the sound practice of marriage.”
George argues that the law can legitimately regulate such things as the definition of marriage, or prohibit abortion. It can even step in to regulate the availability of such things as pornography, and in fact would be acting justly to do these things. “It can be, and often is, unjust to subject people to powerful temptations to do things that are harmful to them, morally or otherwise.” This includes things that may seem to be only private acts, for “The acts of private parties—indeed, sometimes even the private acts of private parties—can and do have public consequences.” When immoral deeds are tolerated (ore worse, encouraged) by the government, public morality is damaged, and with it, private morality.
George then warns against the fallacy of equating the legitimacy of a government or its laws with their popular, democratic establishment. The legitimacy of a government and its laws cannot be based merely on the way in which that government is enacted, but must instead be based the inherent dignity of human beings. He notes that, contrary to the realist or historicist position, tyranny isn’t wrong because it is unpopular, but rather because it I unjust. When a government enacts unjust laws, it is the moral duty of the citizens to fight those laws. “Certain sorts of unjust laws may not licitly be obeyed….The fulfillment of their moral responsibilities requires people to disobey [such] laws.” This is the natural law tradition of philosophy, which contrasts with modern liberalism’s so-called “politics of victimhood” in that the natural law requires responsibilities in addition to granting rights. Thus, for example, it is not morally licit to be “personally opposed to abortion, but pro-choice” as per former New York Governor Mario Cuomo, as people have the moral responsibility to protect the sanctity of human life.
George ends his analysis with a critique of the (Catholic) Church and her role in society. The Church’s efforts to defend traditional morality in the culture war have been hindered by three difficulties which have developed during the last five decades and beyond. The first is that many otherwise faithful Catholics often feel bound to the “deal” struck by John F. Kennedy with the country to keep his faith separate from his politics. This helped to reinforce the unfortunate misconception that the Church desires to impose its views on society, and Kennedy effectively separated his faith from his politics. The result is that many other politicians, especially liberals and particularly Catholics, have followed suit.
The second problem often faced by the Church is that of the dissenting (liberal) theologians, who reject the teaching authority of the Church’s Magisterium. Such theologians often encourage disobedience to the Church’s teachings on doctrine and morality, setting themselves up as an “alternative” teaching authority. When faced with a “choice” between the two disagreeing authorities, many Catholics have chosen to ignore the Church’s teachings, and have further favored eschewing any other morality which they dislike, be it Biblical, traditional, or other.
Finally, the Church has created a problem of its own, with the US Bishops effectively shooting themselves in the foot. Prior to the second Vatican Council, the USCC issued on average 2-3 pastoral letters each year; during the tumultuous years immediately after the council, this number ballooned to about 7, and dealt with a wide range of topics, from the culture of life and sexual morality to taxes and immigration. The mistake made by the Bishops was in issuing specific policy measures, with which faithful Catholics could legitimately disagree. “Dealing with a very wide range of social problems, and attempting to resolve questions on which faithful Catholics might differ…the bishops set themselves up for respectful disagreement by manifestly faithful Catholics on issues of social fact and prudential judgment on which the bishops could claim no special expertise or teaching authority.” Worse still, these policies often favored liberal proposals on such issues as war, immigration, and tax policies, which meant that rather less faithful Catholic politicians were easily able to exploit the disagreement between otherwise loyal Catholics and the bishops on such issues to justify their own dissention on matters such as abortion or sexual morality.
Professor George aptly defends the rationality of the Judeo-Christian orthodoxy against the rival secular orthodoxy of modern liberalism. His expounding of the natural law tradition is both enlightening and thought-provoking. “The Clash of Orthodoxies” is a must-read for anyone who believes in the truth of the Judeo-Christian worldview, and should prove invigorating to those who are undecided between this traditional orthodoxy and the orthodoxy of modern liberalism.
-----
If you like this post and want to read more, here are some related posts:
The Line Through the Heart (Book Review)
What We Can't Not Know (Book Review)
The Revenge of Conscience (Book Review)
Love and Responsibility (Book Review)
Disorientation: A Review in Four Parts (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4)
My review of The Limits of a Limitless Science and Other Essays (Nicene Guys)
My review of Three to Get Married (Nicene Guys)
George argues that on every issue of law pertaining to public morality, from abortion and stem cell research to pornography and gay marriage, reason itself is on the side of the Judeo-Christian orthodoxy. On issues of life, for example, he notes that “If we lay aside all of the rhetorical grandstanding and obviously fallacious arguments, questions of abortion, infanticide, suicide, and euthanasia turn on the question of whether life is intrinsically good, as Judaism and Christianity teach, or merely instrumentally good, as orthodox secularists believe.” If the former is true, then all humans, even the disabled and unborn, have an inherent dignity which “transcend the instrumental purposes to which their lives can be put.” In other words, the value of those persons’ lives does not hinge on such things as what they are capable of, or what the “quality” of those lives may be.
Those who embrace the secularist view that life is merely instrumentally good do so by embracing a sort of dualistic philosophy. Such a philosophy views “the human person as an essentially non-bodily being who inhabits a nonpersonal body.” This view “contrasts with the Judeo-Christian view of the human person as a dynamic unity of body, mind, and spirit.” However, the everyday experiences of any person will show that the dualistic interpretation of “personhood” is utter nonsense: “We don’t sit in the physical body and direct it as an instrument, the way we sit in a car and make it go left or right.” Any theory which seeks to defend such a dualism will ultimately contradict itself, because “reflection necessarily begins from one’s own conscious awareness as oneself as a unitary actor,” that is, as a unity of the mind, body, and will.
Such a defender will therefore be left with no place from which to begin:
“The defender of dualism will…be unable to settle whether the ‘I’ is the conscious and desiring aspect of the ‘self,’ or the ‘mere living body’.…[if] the former, then he separates himself inexplicably from the living human organism that is recognized by others (and, indeed, by himself) as the reality whose behavior…constitutes the philosophical enterprise in question. And if, instead, he identifies the ‘I’ with that ‘mere living body,’ then he leaves no role for the conscious and desiring aspect of the ‘self’ which, on the dualistic account, is truly the ‘person’.”This dualistic outlook is thus rationally untenable.
The same might be said about issues of sexual morality. The traditional Judeo-Christian view towards sex is that it has an intrinsic good as the unification of two people—emotionally, spiritually, psychologically, and bodily. Such unification is inherently tied to the procreative end of sex, as the only act in which two organisms act as a single organism to create new life. “Since men and women are essentially embodied (an not simply inhabitors of a suit of flesh), the biological union of spouses in reproductive-type acts consummates and actualizes their marriage, making the spouses truly, and not merely metaphorically, ‘two in one flesh’.”
Secularists treat sex in a different manner, viewing it as a means of attaining pleasure, or of becoming closer, or of releasing stress—in other words, they view intercourse as being merely instrumentally good. The same can be said of marriage. However, this concept of marriage and sex relies on Hume’s noncognitivist understanding of practical reasoning as being the slave of the passions. “Marital communion cannot be a noninstrumental reason so far as [they are] concerned, because, on this account, there are no noninstrumental reasons.” Such reason is therefore not as detachedly rational or logical as secularists would prefer to claim.
Having refuted such arguments of modern liberalism against the intrinsic good of such things as marriage, life, and traditional morality in general, George then turns to questions of public morality and the law. Many such liberals tend to often turn to the tactic of arguing against the “imposition” of morality on society, even if that morality may be right, because not all people hold to such morality. In other words, they argue that the law ought to maintain a sort of strict moral neutrality. George notes first that this is akin to the old argument against the abolitionists: “If you don’t like slavery, don’t hold slaves.”
There is a second problem with the concept of moral neutrality where it tends towards a sort of “libertinism” towards the law. George notes that “Any effort to achieve neutrality will inevitably prove to be self-defeating. For the law is a teacher.” Thus, for example, by permitting abortion, the law teaches that there is nothing wrong with it, and thus undermines any attempts to establish a consistent culture of life; this in turn tends to undermine such attempts to preserve the sanctity of life in areas such as euthanasia, suicide, cloning, and the “therapeutic” killing of those people who have been deemed “defective.” As regarding marriage, the law can either teach that
“Marriage is a reality that people can choose to participate in, but whose contours people cannot choose to make and remake at will… or the law will teach that marriage is a mere convention which is malleable in such a way that individuals, couples, or indeed groups, can choose to make it whatever suits their [purposes].”
Given the nature of human psychology and sexual morality, the result of this would “be the development of practices and ideologies which tend to undermine the sound practice of marriage.”
George argues that the law can legitimately regulate such things as the definition of marriage, or prohibit abortion. It can even step in to regulate the availability of such things as pornography, and in fact would be acting justly to do these things. “It can be, and often is, unjust to subject people to powerful temptations to do things that are harmful to them, morally or otherwise.” This includes things that may seem to be only private acts, for “The acts of private parties—indeed, sometimes even the private acts of private parties—can and do have public consequences.” When immoral deeds are tolerated (ore worse, encouraged) by the government, public morality is damaged, and with it, private morality.
George then warns against the fallacy of equating the legitimacy of a government or its laws with their popular, democratic establishment. The legitimacy of a government and its laws cannot be based merely on the way in which that government is enacted, but must instead be based the inherent dignity of human beings. He notes that, contrary to the realist or historicist position, tyranny isn’t wrong because it is unpopular, but rather because it I unjust. When a government enacts unjust laws, it is the moral duty of the citizens to fight those laws. “Certain sorts of unjust laws may not licitly be obeyed….The fulfillment of their moral responsibilities requires people to disobey [such] laws.” This is the natural law tradition of philosophy, which contrasts with modern liberalism’s so-called “politics of victimhood” in that the natural law requires responsibilities in addition to granting rights. Thus, for example, it is not morally licit to be “personally opposed to abortion, but pro-choice” as per former New York Governor Mario Cuomo, as people have the moral responsibility to protect the sanctity of human life.
George ends his analysis with a critique of the (Catholic) Church and her role in society. The Church’s efforts to defend traditional morality in the culture war have been hindered by three difficulties which have developed during the last five decades and beyond. The first is that many otherwise faithful Catholics often feel bound to the “deal” struck by John F. Kennedy with the country to keep his faith separate from his politics. This helped to reinforce the unfortunate misconception that the Church desires to impose its views on society, and Kennedy effectively separated his faith from his politics. The result is that many other politicians, especially liberals and particularly Catholics, have followed suit.
The second problem often faced by the Church is that of the dissenting (liberal) theologians, who reject the teaching authority of the Church’s Magisterium. Such theologians often encourage disobedience to the Church’s teachings on doctrine and morality, setting themselves up as an “alternative” teaching authority. When faced with a “choice” between the two disagreeing authorities, many Catholics have chosen to ignore the Church’s teachings, and have further favored eschewing any other morality which they dislike, be it Biblical, traditional, or other.
Finally, the Church has created a problem of its own, with the US Bishops effectively shooting themselves in the foot. Prior to the second Vatican Council, the USCC issued on average 2-3 pastoral letters each year; during the tumultuous years immediately after the council, this number ballooned to about 7, and dealt with a wide range of topics, from the culture of life and sexual morality to taxes and immigration. The mistake made by the Bishops was in issuing specific policy measures, with which faithful Catholics could legitimately disagree. “Dealing with a very wide range of social problems, and attempting to resolve questions on which faithful Catholics might differ…the bishops set themselves up for respectful disagreement by manifestly faithful Catholics on issues of social fact and prudential judgment on which the bishops could claim no special expertise or teaching authority.” Worse still, these policies often favored liberal proposals on such issues as war, immigration, and tax policies, which meant that rather less faithful Catholic politicians were easily able to exploit the disagreement between otherwise loyal Catholics and the bishops on such issues to justify their own dissention on matters such as abortion or sexual morality.
Professor George aptly defends the rationality of the Judeo-Christian orthodoxy against the rival secular orthodoxy of modern liberalism. His expounding of the natural law tradition is both enlightening and thought-provoking. “The Clash of Orthodoxies” is a must-read for anyone who believes in the truth of the Judeo-Christian worldview, and should prove invigorating to those who are undecided between this traditional orthodoxy and the orthodoxy of modern liberalism.
-----
If you like this post and want to read more, here are some related posts:
The Line Through the Heart (Book Review)
What We Can't Not Know (Book Review)
The Revenge of Conscience (Book Review)
Love and Responsibility (Book Review)
Disorientation: A Review in Four Parts (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4)
My review of The Limits of a Limitless Science and Other Essays (Nicene Guys)
My review of Three to Get Married (Nicene Guys)
Thursday, March 15, 2007
Gays and Gags and Group Indoctrinations, Oh My!
It really hasn't taken the homosexual activists long to one-up themselves in their antics to trample religious/moral rights. Getting the Boston area Catholic Charities shut down was pretty impressive, ending in one fell swoop one of the oldest, largest, and most successful adoption agencies in the Bay State. Now a different group has managed to push a mandatory indoctrination class on high-school freshmen. Oh, and they've told the kids not to tell their parents, making them sign a sort of confidentiality "gag-rule" before attending.
Before considering anything else, I’d like to ask something. The whole homosexual movement’s “public face” tried very hard to be “gay pride,” “coming out of the closet,” and other shows of public solidarity within the movement; in short, it tends to be very in-your-face, unabashed, unashamed. With that in mind, why, exactly, is it that so many of these events which are tied in some way to the homosexual movement are shrouded in secrecy? Why the duplicity? The whole thing smacks more of a dirty little secret than anything else, “we can’t tell our parents.” If this is really about education, then there should be no problem at all with telling the parents.
Speaking of education, it seems that normally, when a person wants to learn anything other than the most basic or superficial aspects of a given lesson, he or she tends to do a better job by discussing the material with other people. Specifically, the material is best grasped when discussed away from the classroom. So, at least, is the entire theory of our education system in every other aspect: why, for example, do we tend to spend more time outside of the classroom, working on and discussing homework or readings than we do in the classroom at the university level? But what does a gag rule do, other than to bar discussion about the topic. Apparently the one thing worse than not actually learning anything profound in these seminars is having the students form their own opinions of about the topics presented, especially if those opinions rely in any way on advice from the students’ parents (or any other person whom they may look up to outside of the school system).
Oddly enough, there is one thing for which learning only the superficial is best. It may be the very antithesis of education, but that apparently is not enough to bar it from the classroom. I’m talking about none other than the p-word, and it pops up all over the place in the so-called education system, from the elementary schools to the universities. The academy cannot very well serve two competing masters: it must serve either as a vehicle for education or as a mouthpiece for propaganda. Unfortunately, all too often the latter is chosen.
Aside from the detriment to education, these antics of the homosexual lobby have negative effects on another aspect of society. On the surface, it may seem ironic: the very people who lobby for the extension of the privilege of marriage to same-sex couples, the same people who want homosexual families, are by their actions weakening the glue which binds families together. Honesty, trust, these are two aspects of the family life which are a must for strong families. How can a family remain a family if parents and children can’t trust each other? Will the family remain “close” if none of the members can depend on the others’ being honest? Communication between parents and their teenage (or older) children is often difficult when each believes that the other is being honest, but these antics make the act almost impossible.
This is not, of course, the only time that the so-called gay rights activists have acted in a way which is destructive to others. I earlier alluded to the Boston area Catholic Charities, another triumph for the homosexual movement. Catholic Charities refused, on moral and other grounds, to place children for adoption with same-sex couples. They did this because they are a Catholic organization, and the Catholic Church teaches, as she has always taught, that homosexuality is morally disordered. Apparently, the First Amendment’s protection of religious freedoms, while useful for banishing historic symbols of Christianity from public places, does not extend so far as to protect the rights of a religious organization to remain faithful to the moral teachings of its faith.
As for the children which Catholic Charities otherwise would have placed for adoption in loving families, they are at best collateral damage, their hopes of living “normal” lives with loving parents an unfortunate casualty in the same-sex groups’ own war for “normalcy.” Nevermind, of course, that these couples could just as easily seek out another adoption agency which might be more than happy to place a child with them. It’s the concept that this particular group had moral objections to their lifestyle choices which they saw as a problem, and thus Catholic Charities must change or be destroyed. One wonders how many of these children will never have a family of their own as a result.
I earlier stated that this scorched-earth policy of sabotaging families only appears to be an ironic tactic for the gay-rights lobby. In truth, it is not the least bit surprising. Much of the rhetoric throughout the debate over same-sex unions, marriages or marriages by any other name, has turned towards the alleged failure of the traditional families: the soaring divorce rates is the best known example. Is it any surprise, then, that these groups would seek to subvert traditional families? If they can demonstrate that the traditional family is a failure, then it becomes more difficult to demonstrate that same-sex families are a bad idea. If they can point to examples of strife between parents and children in the traditional families, then it becomes easier for them to argue that they ought to be allowed to have children of their own. And most importantly, if they can crush the voices which dare to oppose them, then they hope that they can silence their own consciences’ telling them that what they’re doing is just not right.
The gay-rights movement often tries to paint itself as the successor the civil rights movement. What they overlook so often is that the civil rights movement was largely orchestrated in such a way as to not ruin the lives or families of those in society who dared to oppose them. By demanding to create a non-existent equality in happiness, they can succeed in making only an equality in misery. Dr. King’s “Dream” is replaced by Orwell’s nightmare, one in which children can’t look to their parents for support nor parents to their children for trust.
Before considering anything else, I’d like to ask something. The whole homosexual movement’s “public face” tried very hard to be “gay pride,” “coming out of the closet,” and other shows of public solidarity within the movement; in short, it tends to be very in-your-face, unabashed, unashamed. With that in mind, why, exactly, is it that so many of these events which are tied in some way to the homosexual movement are shrouded in secrecy? Why the duplicity? The whole thing smacks more of a dirty little secret than anything else, “we can’t tell our parents.” If this is really about education, then there should be no problem at all with telling the parents.
Speaking of education, it seems that normally, when a person wants to learn anything other than the most basic or superficial aspects of a given lesson, he or she tends to do a better job by discussing the material with other people. Specifically, the material is best grasped when discussed away from the classroom. So, at least, is the entire theory of our education system in every other aspect: why, for example, do we tend to spend more time outside of the classroom, working on and discussing homework or readings than we do in the classroom at the university level? But what does a gag rule do, other than to bar discussion about the topic. Apparently the one thing worse than not actually learning anything profound in these seminars is having the students form their own opinions of about the topics presented, especially if those opinions rely in any way on advice from the students’ parents (or any other person whom they may look up to outside of the school system).
Oddly enough, there is one thing for which learning only the superficial is best. It may be the very antithesis of education, but that apparently is not enough to bar it from the classroom. I’m talking about none other than the p-word, and it pops up all over the place in the so-called education system, from the elementary schools to the universities. The academy cannot very well serve two competing masters: it must serve either as a vehicle for education or as a mouthpiece for propaganda. Unfortunately, all too often the latter is chosen.
Aside from the detriment to education, these antics of the homosexual lobby have negative effects on another aspect of society. On the surface, it may seem ironic: the very people who lobby for the extension of the privilege of marriage to same-sex couples, the same people who want homosexual families, are by their actions weakening the glue which binds families together. Honesty, trust, these are two aspects of the family life which are a must for strong families. How can a family remain a family if parents and children can’t trust each other? Will the family remain “close” if none of the members can depend on the others’ being honest? Communication between parents and their teenage (or older) children is often difficult when each believes that the other is being honest, but these antics make the act almost impossible.
This is not, of course, the only time that the so-called gay rights activists have acted in a way which is destructive to others. I earlier alluded to the Boston area Catholic Charities, another triumph for the homosexual movement. Catholic Charities refused, on moral and other grounds, to place children for adoption with same-sex couples. They did this because they are a Catholic organization, and the Catholic Church teaches, as she has always taught, that homosexuality is morally disordered. Apparently, the First Amendment’s protection of religious freedoms, while useful for banishing historic symbols of Christianity from public places, does not extend so far as to protect the rights of a religious organization to remain faithful to the moral teachings of its faith.
As for the children which Catholic Charities otherwise would have placed for adoption in loving families, they are at best collateral damage, their hopes of living “normal” lives with loving parents an unfortunate casualty in the same-sex groups’ own war for “normalcy.” Nevermind, of course, that these couples could just as easily seek out another adoption agency which might be more than happy to place a child with them. It’s the concept that this particular group had moral objections to their lifestyle choices which they saw as a problem, and thus Catholic Charities must change or be destroyed. One wonders how many of these children will never have a family of their own as a result.
I earlier stated that this scorched-earth policy of sabotaging families only appears to be an ironic tactic for the gay-rights lobby. In truth, it is not the least bit surprising. Much of the rhetoric throughout the debate over same-sex unions, marriages or marriages by any other name, has turned towards the alleged failure of the traditional families: the soaring divorce rates is the best known example. Is it any surprise, then, that these groups would seek to subvert traditional families? If they can demonstrate that the traditional family is a failure, then it becomes more difficult to demonstrate that same-sex families are a bad idea. If they can point to examples of strife between parents and children in the traditional families, then it becomes easier for them to argue that they ought to be allowed to have children of their own. And most importantly, if they can crush the voices which dare to oppose them, then they hope that they can silence their own consciences’ telling them that what they’re doing is just not right.
The gay-rights movement often tries to paint itself as the successor the civil rights movement. What they overlook so often is that the civil rights movement was largely orchestrated in such a way as to not ruin the lives or families of those in society who dared to oppose them. By demanding to create a non-existent equality in happiness, they can succeed in making only an equality in misery. Dr. King’s “Dream” is replaced by Orwell’s nightmare, one in which children can’t look to their parents for support nor parents to their children for trust.
Monday, March 12, 2007
Movie Review: 300
The movie 300 certainly made for some interesting viewing. There were plenty of patriotic-sounding one-liners, the courage of the Spartan warriors, and the audacity and defiance of King Leonidas himself. And while the movie was certainly somewhat entertaining, it also failed to really stimulate the imagination in any meaningful manner—or perhaps worse, it did so in a sort of distorted way.
The story itself is good enough, as far as it goes, being based on one of the older legends of a few men standing against many. The concept may perhaps be thought of as a sort of just war, waged by Leonidas and a handful of others against a marauding horde of Persians bent on conquering Greece, and with it, the world. Leonidas and his followers, a handful of well-trained Spartan warriors, refuse to submit to the tyranny of the Persian king, choosing instead to pit a few soldiers against the might of the Asian armies.
The bravery of Leonidas and his men in the film was unmistakable, but was it truly a model of courage to look to? For Leonidas spurned not only his enemies, but also his gods. As one watches the movie, and particularly the parts in which the pagan oracle’s cult become involved, one cannot help but to think that the writers had a broader target in mind that a handful of pagan priests during Leonidas’ polemic against the oracles. With the exception of the Spartan’s rejoicing at the intervention of Zeus in the stormy seas, most references towards the gods were dismissive or even condescending, and not in the sense of merely the old philosophical question which plagued the Greeks, namely, whether the gods controlled the Fates of the Fates controlled the gods. The priests were painted as greedy and corrupt, and the gods as contemptible.
As for Leonidas himself, he seemed a patriot, standing for the country which he loved against forces which would destroy it forever. He fought, in his words, for the freedom of Greece. This was true enough, for the facts that he refused offers of honor and glory by his enemies suggested that he was fighting for more than his own fame, and having turned his back on his local gods could only look to his city’s freedom as cause for fighting. On the other hand, he did choose to send a messenger back to Sparta and then to the rest of Greece to spread his fame, so there may have been a hint of his desire for his own glory to it (beyond simply rallying support for the Greeks to commit their resources towards staving off the attack).
Unfortunately, the writers and directors weren’t able to do enough to stimulate the imagination with the main conflict alone. Certainly, they included some amount of treason and corruption, but this was all spelled out plainly throughout the movie, lacking any form of intrigue—they rejected an intricate plot in favor of focusing more on the battle itself. Violence and battles can certainly be entertaining, but generally only if balanced with some form of plot, of anticipation; this movie contained little of either. There was certainly the initial build-up to the battle, but it was largely inadequate for building up the anticipation for the battle itself. There was no fear, no great challenge for the protagonists to overcome beyond a simple numerical inferiority; entertaining, yes, but it did little to stir the imagination.
However, the writers and directors did turn to another solution lest their audiences not be held captive by the fighting alone. There was of course the struggle of the Queen Gorgo and her friend on the council to persuade the Spartan city to commit to the war. Here was presented a second opportunity to introduce some form of intrigue, or perhaps some character development. The writers certainly did allow for some amount of betrayal, but it was a betrayal that was never really hidden. The betrayer himself was obvious from the onset, and had no redeeming qualities: he was a man that everybody could love to hate. But even here, there was no actual development of any of the major characters, each seeming static and predictable, unsurprising in any way.
Lest the carnal desires not be quenched by violence alone, a second stirring of the passions was added. We could have told that Leonidas loved his queen without needing to see every detail of that love on display; many people may here object that, after al, the two were married. I may grant this, but why is it necessary to show us an act which is private between two people as a form of public entertainment? Beyond just this, why do we need to see the actual nudity of the two people engaging in the act, in what way is it so important to this movie that we need to see the couple getting it on up close and personal? And what of the writhing and partly naked young oracle, caught in the throws of her own ecstasy earlier in the movie, or the scene in which Leonidas’ wife attempts to bribe the corrupt councilmen, Theron, with acts of adultery which may only be described as consensual rape? Given that these things did little to contribute to the development of either the plot or the characters themselves, the only reason for including them is to replace some desire for violence with that of lust.
All things considered, this movie essentially splits the difference between those movies which are well done, and those which are not very good at all. For example, it compares poorly to many of the better Epic movies, from Braveheart and Gladiator to Lord of the Rings and Troy. Does the courage of the Spartans match that of Willaim Wallace, or their defiance match that of the Gladiator? Does the nobility of Leonidas compare to that of Aaragon or Hektar? Nay, but rather the violence of combat dominated 300, making it perhaps entertaining (which is more than can be said of, say Alexander), though neither challenging nor imaginative.
The story itself is good enough, as far as it goes, being based on one of the older legends of a few men standing against many. The concept may perhaps be thought of as a sort of just war, waged by Leonidas and a handful of others against a marauding horde of Persians bent on conquering Greece, and with it, the world. Leonidas and his followers, a handful of well-trained Spartan warriors, refuse to submit to the tyranny of the Persian king, choosing instead to pit a few soldiers against the might of the Asian armies.
The bravery of Leonidas and his men in the film was unmistakable, but was it truly a model of courage to look to? For Leonidas spurned not only his enemies, but also his gods. As one watches the movie, and particularly the parts in which the pagan oracle’s cult become involved, one cannot help but to think that the writers had a broader target in mind that a handful of pagan priests during Leonidas’ polemic against the oracles. With the exception of the Spartan’s rejoicing at the intervention of Zeus in the stormy seas, most references towards the gods were dismissive or even condescending, and not in the sense of merely the old philosophical question which plagued the Greeks, namely, whether the gods controlled the Fates of the Fates controlled the gods. The priests were painted as greedy and corrupt, and the gods as contemptible.
As for Leonidas himself, he seemed a patriot, standing for the country which he loved against forces which would destroy it forever. He fought, in his words, for the freedom of Greece. This was true enough, for the facts that he refused offers of honor and glory by his enemies suggested that he was fighting for more than his own fame, and having turned his back on his local gods could only look to his city’s freedom as cause for fighting. On the other hand, he did choose to send a messenger back to Sparta and then to the rest of Greece to spread his fame, so there may have been a hint of his desire for his own glory to it (beyond simply rallying support for the Greeks to commit their resources towards staving off the attack).
Unfortunately, the writers and directors weren’t able to do enough to stimulate the imagination with the main conflict alone. Certainly, they included some amount of treason and corruption, but this was all spelled out plainly throughout the movie, lacking any form of intrigue—they rejected an intricate plot in favor of focusing more on the battle itself. Violence and battles can certainly be entertaining, but generally only if balanced with some form of plot, of anticipation; this movie contained little of either. There was certainly the initial build-up to the battle, but it was largely inadequate for building up the anticipation for the battle itself. There was no fear, no great challenge for the protagonists to overcome beyond a simple numerical inferiority; entertaining, yes, but it did little to stir the imagination.
However, the writers and directors did turn to another solution lest their audiences not be held captive by the fighting alone. There was of course the struggle of the Queen Gorgo and her friend on the council to persuade the Spartan city to commit to the war. Here was presented a second opportunity to introduce some form of intrigue, or perhaps some character development. The writers certainly did allow for some amount of betrayal, but it was a betrayal that was never really hidden. The betrayer himself was obvious from the onset, and had no redeeming qualities: he was a man that everybody could love to hate. But even here, there was no actual development of any of the major characters, each seeming static and predictable, unsurprising in any way.
Lest the carnal desires not be quenched by violence alone, a second stirring of the passions was added. We could have told that Leonidas loved his queen without needing to see every detail of that love on display; many people may here object that, after al, the two were married. I may grant this, but why is it necessary to show us an act which is private between two people as a form of public entertainment? Beyond just this, why do we need to see the actual nudity of the two people engaging in the act, in what way is it so important to this movie that we need to see the couple getting it on up close and personal? And what of the writhing and partly naked young oracle, caught in the throws of her own ecstasy earlier in the movie, or the scene in which Leonidas’ wife attempts to bribe the corrupt councilmen, Theron, with acts of adultery which may only be described as consensual rape? Given that these things did little to contribute to the development of either the plot or the characters themselves, the only reason for including them is to replace some desire for violence with that of lust.
All things considered, this movie essentially splits the difference between those movies which are well done, and those which are not very good at all. For example, it compares poorly to many of the better Epic movies, from Braveheart and Gladiator to Lord of the Rings and Troy. Does the courage of the Spartans match that of Willaim Wallace, or their defiance match that of the Gladiator? Does the nobility of Leonidas compare to that of Aaragon or Hektar? Nay, but rather the violence of combat dominated 300, making it perhaps entertaining (which is more than can be said of, say Alexander), though neither challenging nor imaginative.
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